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THE ANTITRUST CHALLENGE TO
NON-PROFIT CERTIFICATION
ORGANIZATIONS: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
AND A PRACTICAL RULE OF REASON
APPROACH TO CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS
AS INDUSTRY-WIDE BUILDERS OF
COMPETITION AND EFFICIENCY
JONATHAN T. HOWE*
LELAND J. BADGER**
I. INTRODUCTION
The paramount antitrust challenge for nonprofit product certification
programs is to demonstrate aggressively that such programs strengthen
the competitive market system on an industry-wide basis. Industry-
wide certification programs should be recognized not merely as con-
sumer protection devices,' but as increasingly valuable elements for
building competition and manufacturing efficiency and productivity in
the marketplace hierarchy. More urgently now than at any time since
the Great Depression, antitrust analysis and law, the "umpire" of the
market system, must focus on these key benefits of certification pro-
grams in the attempt to eliminate crippling anticompetitive market
structure and conduct. The economic realities and perils of the 1980s
make this assessment imperative.
Increased concentration with smaller numbers of companies2 and an
alarming decline in the growth of manufacturing productivity in seg-
* Senior Partner, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Illinois. B.A., 1963, Northwestern University;
JD., 1966, Duke University.
** Partner, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Illinois. A.B., 1970, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1973,
Harvard University.
1. Wachtel, Products Standards And Certpfcation Programs, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 1-4
(1968).
2. E., Interview of William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, De-
partment of Justice, [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1025, at AAI-3 (July
30, 1981). See also R. BoRIc, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 2-11,
90-133, 163-262, 310-30 (1978); M. GREEN, B. MOORE & B. WASSERSTEIN, RALPH NADER'S
STUDY GROUP REPORT ON ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT. THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 3-29
(1972).
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ments of the economy have heightened antitrust debate and economic
concern. 3 In the midst of these economic currents, industry-wide certi-
fication programs, based upon product performance standards, 4 offer
unique opportunities to stimulate competition and manufacturing pro-
ductivity on an industry-wide basis. Certification programs build com-
petition by lowering artificial barriers to market entry, including
unnecessary product differentiation5 and undue capital requirements.6
Certification programs increase the manufacturing productivity of all
competitors within an industry by facilitating certain manufacturing ef-
ficiencies and systematic quality control disciplines.7
This affirmative challenge is, however, limited by another urgent an-
titrust challenge still closer to the courtroom door. This challenge, re-
quiring advance organizational and litigation planning, is to avoid or
defeat a possible plaintiff's claim of antitrust abuses by a certification
organization whose decisionmaking participants may be caught in al-
leged conflicts of interest.
These two challenges must be met for certification programs to sur-
vive and progress. The only way successfully to meet these antitrust
challenges is to make product performance certification programs sy-
nonymous with industry-wide competition and productivity and with
systems of safeguards against conflicts of interest. Further, this must be
proved to the judge and jury.
This Article will discuss two critical questions that flow from an ana-
lytical approach to these two challenges: First, whether a coherent ba-
sis exists for viewing nonprofit certification programs as structural
elements in the marketplace hierarchy that advance urgent antitrust
goals, including increased competition and productivity; and second,
whether a distinct duty to safeguard certification organizations against
conflicts of interest would, if met, demonstrate that a certification or-
ganization under antitrust scrutiny in court should be found to be with-
out conspiratorial intent.
3. See, e.g., President's State of the Union Address, 1982 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEWS
D3 (Jan. 26, 1982).
4. A performance standard, as contrasted to a design standard, is one in which a product in
question is capable of achieving or exceeding the desired result in performance without concern as
to design. A design standard establishes product design and structural criteria, with the net result
of yielding performance based solely on pre-determined product structure.
5. See notes 58-59 infra and accompanying text.
6. See id.
7. See note 62 and accompanying text.
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PRODUCT CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS
II. HYDROLEVE---"A LOOSE (SECOND CIRCUIT) CANNON
ON THE DECK"
Commercial conflicts of interest in certification organizations and
possible anticompetitive restraints on competitors8 constitute the cur-
rent most significant antitrust problem facing industry-wide certifica-
tion programs. This antitrust problem highlights the need for
businessmen and courts to view the conflicts of interest issue side-by-
side with the distinct duty imposed upon certification organizations to
possess safeguards against these conflicts of interest. This duty is sug-
gested both by due process considerations and by the extent to which
certification programs play an industry self-regulation role. To the at-
torney, either as advisor or litigator, such a side-by-side examination is
vital because it demonstrates that carefully structured and administered
certification programs with such safeguards can lead to increasingly
unique antitrust benefits on an industry-wide basis in the economy.
This antitrust problem is highlighted in Hydrolevel Corp. v. American
Society of Mechanical Engineers.' The case provides an excellent ex-
ample of confusion in assessing a practical solution to the conflict of
interest problem.10 In Hydrolevel, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
failed to make a side-by-side examination. The court affirmed an anti-
trust liability judgment for conspiracy to restrain trade against the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), a nonprofit engi-
neering and standards organization. The court attributed conspirato-
rial intent to ASME" from the collusive exclusionary interpretations of
organization standards by two ASME committee members whose pri-
8. See discussion in text at III F infra. Possible anticompetitive restraints are due to an
inability to obtain product certification, following adverse administrative interpretations by com-
mittees of organization members. See generally Hoffman, Industry- Wide Codes, Adverising, Seals
of 4pprovalandStandards: As Participatedln By The Trade Association, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 595,
600-01 (1968); Hummell, Antitrust Problems of Industry Codes ofAdvertising Standardization, and
Seals ofApproval, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 607, 614-17 (1968).
9. 635 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981) (oral argument heard on
January 13, 1982).
10. Inasmuch as this Article has been written during the interregnum between the Second
Circuit decision and United States Supreme Court decision in Hydrolevel, the Hydrolevel case is
treated herein principally as an example of the need to propose a workable solution to the conflict
of interest problem in certification organizations; the Second Circuit decision, however, also war-
rants criticism regarding the novel use of an "apparent agency" theory of liability for an organiza-
tion due to the misconduct of certain organization members. See notes 86-95 infra and
accompanying text.
11. 635 F.2d at 127.
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vate corporate interests led to decisions adverse to a competitor. The
court did reverse the 7.5 million dollar damage award against ASME,
though, and remanded the case for a new trial on damages. The liabil-
ity judgment emphasized, however, the need to determine how non-
profit certification programs' 2 may best advance their unique
commercial and procompetitive antitrust benefits yet still avoid being
victimized by the antitrust sins of small numbers of their own
participants. 13
For the certification organization, the solution to the conflict of inter-
est problem lies in recognizing a distinct duty to use a practical system
of due process-related safeguards in its ongoing program activities. For
the court, the solution rests in analyzing the injury and intent issues of
antitrust liability with a rule of reason approach and with an eviden-
tiary standard that focuses on the existence, or nonexistence, of those
safeguards. This is especially appropriate in view of the unique indus-
try-wide antitrust benefits that certification programs may have.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Chicago Board of Trade v.
UnitedStates,'4 the rule of reason'5 has been applied to standards and
12. Standards-development organizations such as ASME may be viewed as "first cousins" of
organizations which are primarily involved in certification activities.
13. The Hydrolevel decision has gained wide attention. More than a dozen amicus curiae
briefs were filed, including an amicus curiae brief by the Justice Department and Federal Trade
Commission in support of the liability judgment against ASME.
14. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). In Chicago Board of Trade, the Supreme Court confronted a chal-
lenge to the "Call" rule adopted by the Board in 1906. The "Call" was a session at the end of each
trading day at which members set the price for commodities "to arrive," that is, commodities
either already in transit to Chicago or to arrive in Chicago by a specified date. The "Call" rule
prohibited members of the Board from purchasing shipments of wheat, corn, oats or rye "to ar-
rive" at any price other than the price set at the Call between the Call and the beginning of the
next business day. Id. at 236-37. The Court, finding that the "Call" rule improved market condi-
tions, held that it did not violate the Sherman Act. .d. at 240-41.
15. In Chicago Board of Trade, Justice Brandeis formulated the classic statement of the rule
of reason:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to
restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed
is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is ap-
plied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained,
are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objec-
tionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to
interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id. at 238. For prior statements of the rule of reason, see United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/5
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certification programs of trade associations and other industry self-reg-
ulation programs 6 for claims other than outright collusion and "gar-
den variety" price-fixing. t7 The courts have regularly upheld
organization programs with redeeming procompetitive effects (and
therefore reasonable restraints) that produce no antitrust injury.' 8 In
addition, observing due process standards, both substantive and proce-
dural, historically has been one of the legal duties of trade associations
and related industry programs under a rule of reason approach.' 9
In Hydrolevel, however, the Second Circuit ignored the practicalities
of safeguards against conflicts of interest and unduly limited the rule of
reason approach. It adopted a vicarious antitrust liability principle and
a narrow "apparent agency" evidentiary standard2" for the conflicts of
interest of the two ASME committee members in determining whether
ASME possessed the conspiratorial intent necessary for antitrust liabil-
ity. In the context of certification programs, this approach creates four
problems. First, it is illogical. Second, it greatly and unnecessarily in-
creases the risk of antitrust liability by creating a strict liability stan-
dard, or virtual per se rule of liability, for limited participant
misconduct. Third, it is inconsistent with the rule of reason standard
221 U.S. 106, 178-80 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911). For a
subsequent formulation of the rule of reason, see National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (1978). See generally Bork, The Rule ofReason and the Per Se Con-
cept: Price.Fixing and Market Divisions (pts. I-II), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965); Sullivan & Wiley,
Recent Antitrust Developments: Defiing the Scope of Exemption, Expanding Coverage, and Refi-
ing the Rule ofReason, 27 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 265 (1979); 75 YALE L.J. 375 (1966). See also notes
82-84 infra and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Maple Flooring Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); National Macaroni
Mfrs. Assoc. v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965); Milk and Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d
478 (7th Cir. 1946); Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 468 F.
Supp. 154 (C.D. Calif. 1979), 484 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Calif.) (temporary injunction), rev'd, 634
F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1980); Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp.
154 (D. Or. 1966), a 'd, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969).
17. See, e.g., Bond Crown & Cork Co. v. FTC, 176 F.2d 974, 979 (4th Cir. 1949); Milk and
Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC 152 F.2d 478, 480, 484 (7th Cir. 1946).
18. See, eg., Tag Mfrs.' Inst. v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949).
19. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); McCreery Angus Farms v.
American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D. Ill.), aft'd, 506 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974); FTC
Adv. Op. (File No. 713 7002), 78 FTC 1628 (1971) codified at 16 C.F.R. § 15.457 (1981). See
generally Wachtel, supra note 1, at 23-25, 31-32.
20. 635 F.2d at 127. The court stated, "[flor ASME to be liable, then, Hydrolevel had to
demonstrate only that ASME's agents acted within their apparent authority when participating in
the company; it did not have to demonstrate that they also acted in part to benefit ASME or that
ASME later ratified their actions." Id For definitions of apparent authority, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8, 159 (1957).
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for the general issue of liability. Finally, it leaves unsettled the liability
and evidentiary standards to be used in determining conspiratorial in-
tent. The Second Circuit Hydrolevel evidentiary rule invites only cha-
otic and confusing proof before a trier of fact as to the scope of the rule
of reason standard. This approach, then, should be rejected as unsuita-
ble for the proper antitrust analysis of nonprofit certification programs.
For properly structured certification programs, the risk of antitrust lia-
bility should be minimal if weighed according to a broad and consis-
tent rule of reason standard. Because practical structural frameworks
exist for certification programs to meet the discreet duty to safeguard
against conflicts of interest, there is every reason for certification pro-
grams to achieve their unique promise of becoming industry-wide
builders of competition and efficiency.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS
A. Product Certfcation in General
Product certification is a process of product evaluation, including
testing and analysis, administered and managed by a third-party certifi-
cation agency. It allows manufacturers to attest that their products sat-
isfy the applicable standards and related procedural requirements of
the certification program.2"
Over one thousand private sector laboratories perform testing and
services related to certification.22 Many of the laboratories are affili-
ated with third-party certification programs sponsored and adminis-
tered by nonprofit certification organizations or trade associations,
often with public interest representatives. 23 In addition, numerous in-
house manufacturers' laboratories, as well as nonprofit entities such as
21. See Hoffman,Antitrust Issues In SeltingAndEnforcing Standards, in BUREAU OF COMPE-
TITION, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE SOLAR MARKET: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM
ON COMPETITION IN THE SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRY 59, 61 (1978). See also S. 825, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 5(18) 123 CONG. REc. 5651, 5659 (1977) (proposed Voluntary Standards and Accredita-
tion Act of 1977, considered but not reported out of the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary); Lane, Trade and Professional Associations: Ethics and
Standards, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 653, 654-55 (1977) (purpose of Act is to provide for a uniform
national standardization process).
22. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STANDARDS
AND CERTIFICATION, PROPOSED RULE AND STAFF REPORT 75 (1978) [hereinafter cited as FTC
PROPOSED RULE AND STAFF REPORT].
23. Id. at 70.
[Vol. 60:357
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Underwriters Laboratories and various commercial entities, 24 also en-
gage in certification testing. Those resulting types of certification, how-
ever, lead to representations of certification status either by the
manufacturers without the involvement of industry-wide third-party
administrative bodies or by the laboratories rather than the
manufacturers.
B. Certqcation Has A Dynamic Impact on the Public
The numerous nonprofit certification programs help assure that par-
ticipating manufacturers comply with an important range of product
standards25 having a significant, but often overlooked, impact on the
American public.26 Over 400 private standards-developing organiza-
tions are responsible for promulgation of these standards. 27 Compli-
ance with such standards, which is influenced by certification
24. Id. at 71-72.
25. Perhaps the bulk of these standards concern product performance, efficiency, durability,
safety or health-related concerns. Some such standards are "grading" standards, including differ-
ent performance classifications, while others are "pass-fail" standards. Numerous other standards
are structural, design, or processing standards, such as those relating to heat treatment of steel.
26. Curran, Industrial Standards, Antitrust, and the Logic of Public Action: An Historical
Searchfora RationalPublic Policy, 17 DUQ. L. REv. 717,717-18 n.4 (1978) (quoting CENTER FOR
THE STUDY OF RESPONSIVE LAW, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT TRADE PRODUCT STAN-
D ARDS: A PRIMER FOR CONSUMERS PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST AND
MONOPOLY, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977)).
Trade product standards are an area of our economy known to few consumers. Yet, as is
often the case with such backwaters of corporate activity, trade standards have an enor-
mous impact on our lives. Over 20,000 trade standards at least partly determine the
safety, availability and price of products ranging from household gas stoves to nuclear
reactors. For consumers, trade product standards determine such things as the length of
shoelaces, width of auto tires, ingredients of house paint, the specifications of lawn
mowers, sizes of door frames, and safety of child car seats.
Id.
27. National Bureau of Standards, Directory of Standardization Activitles, NBS Special Publi-
cation 417 (1975). Eg., American National Standards Institute (ANSI); American Society for
Testing and Materials (ASTM); National Fire Protection Association (NFPA); Illuminating Engi-
neering Society (IES); Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE); the Instrument So-
ciety of America (ISA); the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE); the American Society of
Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE); the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME); Aerospace Industries Association of America (AIAA); American
Gear Manufacturers Association (AGMA); Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers
(AHAM); Electronic Industries Association (EIA); Gas Appliance Manufacturers Association
(GAMA); National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA); Tile Council of America
TCA); Building Officials and Code Administrators International (BOCA); International Associa-
tion of Plumbing and Mechanical Officials (IAPMA); International Conference of Building Offi-
cials (ICBO); Southern Building Code Congress (SBCC); and the American Insurance Association
(AIA).
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programs, has such an element of public interest that standards and
certification programs have been said to represent a virtual quasi-gov-
ernmental public function.2"
C. Administrative Aspects of Certffcation Programs
The administrative practices of certification programs may vary ac-
cording to the needs of product buyers, insurers or code authorities. In
general, the process includes five elements.2 9 First, an independent
third party program administrator initially selects sample products in
accordance with standard sampling plans. Second, approved laborato-
ries test or evaluate sample products in accordance with standard test
methods for conformance with established industry performance stan-
dards. Third, results are reported in a standard format. Fourth, quali-
ty control and verification procedures are established to compare test
results for samples originally tested with those of units produced on the
assembly line.30 Finally, registered certification marks3I are used on
registered products to show compliance with applicable standards and
procedures.32
Each of these steps is interdependent and, as a whole, the administra-
tion of the certification process provides, in a dynamic fashion, a credi-
ble quality control mechanism for the participating manufacturer,
industry, product buyers, insurers, and code authority. As test methods
and performance standards change over time, the certification program
is able to adopt those changes and its administrative organization can
make the evolving test methods and standards immediately meaningful
in the marketplace.
28. Curran, supra note 26, at 717-21.
29. FTC PROPOSED RULE AND STAFF REPORT, supra note 22, at 77-82.
30. These procedures may include unannounced periodic factory visits and further random
testing of assembly line produced units.
31. Trademarks owned by certification organizations may be registered with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office as "certification marks," which may be used by those licensed
by a certification organization to represent successful participation in the certification program
according to the standards and procedures used by the program.
32. Certain third party certification organizations, such as Underwriters Laboratories, in
which the organization actually puts a "seal of approval" on a product, may act as virtual guaran-
tors or warrantors of the product. Other types of organizations, including the ones principally
discussed herein, allow the use of "certification marks" to show validation of the manufacturer's
certification or representation of compliance with program standards and procedures,
[Vol. 60:357
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D. Use of Certfication Program Participant Committees and Boards
The vast bulk of nonprofit certification organizations are composed
of groups of industry competitors who utilize third party program ad-
ministrators to execute assigned ministerial responsibilities. In the form
of committees and boards, representatives of participant companies
possess the authority to establish program operational guidelines and
interpretations for the program that assist in application of the industry
standards to the certification process. As a result, a program partici-
pant's ultimate judge and jury, while truly one of peers, is also one of
competitors in the marketplace.
These representatives typically are skilled engineers and manufactur-
ing executives carefully chosen by their companies and laboratories for
their expert backgrounds and leadership abilities. These industry repre-
sentatives serve on a certification organization's various working com-
mittees, but ultimately all reports and decisions are submitted to the
organization's board of directors for review and possible ratification.
Members of the board are elected in democratic fashion from among
the representatives of the participant companies according to the by-
laws of the certification organization. Because the board, as well as the
committees, may also include public interest representatives from con-
sumer groups, university graduate school faculties, and expert consult-
ing firms, the board is truly an open marketplace of ideas and opinions.
It maintains enough continuity and technical competence, however, to
provide stability and perspective in reviewing and ratifying proposed
solutions to administrative problems.
E. The Realities of Program Guidelines, Interpretations and Decisions
Committees and boards of certification programs formulate guide-
lines and interpretations that mix objective and subjective judgments.
These decisions, an unavoidable fact of administrative life, are critical
in maintaining the confidence of participant companies in the integrity
of certification programs. They are also crucial in maintaining the con-
fidence of the public in the integrity of the certification claims made by
the participant companies. These program guidelines and interpreta-
tions concern the standards, test methods, and procedures of the pro-
gram. They principally serve to provide for the following participant
and organization needs: development of general budget economies;
avoidance of time delays and expenses from unnecessary repetitive test-
Number 2]
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ing; enhancement of program efficiency in the scheduling and con-
ducting of laboratory tests and plant inspections; and formulation of
rational responses to changes in the standards and test methods that are
issued over time by the various standards-development organizations.
The decisions of the certification program committees and boards on
the above issues additionally reflect an overall fundamental considera-
tion. In view of the extraordinary commercial significance of certifica-
tion programs and the type of industry self-regulation which they
represent, it is well settled that a due process requirement exists for the
open and unfettered opportunity for each of the parties principally af-
fected by the program to submit their own views, and to comment on
each other's views, as to the program's administrative matters. This
due process r.equirement is clear for standards-development organiza-
tions"3 and, in light of the equal or greater commercial power of the
certification programs implementing those standards, also extends to
industry-wide certification programs.3 a
Among the types of issues debated and decided by certification pro-
gram committees and boards are two very important questions: first,
whether a nonmarketed research product may undergo precertification
testing and checks; and second, whether various changes in manufac-
turing methods and components from those used with a certified prod-
uct constitute inconsequential changes of form or significant changes of
substance in the overall product as a whole. When a new product has
come into being a new round of certification tests and assembly-line
inspections, involving appreciable time and expense, is necessary for
the manufacturer to represent the product as certified. When the
changes are inconsequential matters of form and the product is not new
or different in substance and performance, the issue will arise whether a
new round of testing and inspections can be avoided. To answer these
questions inevitably requires the use of both objective and subjective
judgments.
33. See Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A- 119, "Federal Participation in
the Development and Use of Voluntary Standards" (January 17, 1980); Department of Commerce
"Final Procedures" to implement OMB Circular A-i 19, 46 Fed. Reg. 1574 (1931). See also FTC
Adv. Op. No. 457 (File No. 713 7002), 78 FTC 1628 (1971), cod#ffedat 16 C.F.R. § 15.457 (1981).
34. See FTC Adv. Op. No. 457 (File No. 713 7002), codofedat 16 C.F.R. § 15.457 (1981);
FTC Adv. Op. No. 152,72 FTC 1053 (1967), codifledat 16 C.F.R. § 15.152 (1981); FTC Adv. Op.
No. 96, (File No. 673 7006) 70 FTC 1878 (1966), codfledat 16 C.F.R. § 15.96 (1981).
[Vol. 60:357
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/5
PRODUCT CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS
1. Certjcation Program Arrangements For Experimental Prototype
Products
A manufacturer that has produced an experimental prototype prod-
uct may desire to know whether the product, when introduced into the
market, may immediately be marketed as certified. Due to the experi-
mental prototype nature of the product, however, no regular assembly
line exists for its production. In addition, the manufacturer may decide
to modify various aspects of the product depending upon the results of
ongoing research. If marketed, however, acceptance of the product by
various customers may depend partly or completely upon whether the
product bears a certification program label immediately upon introduc-
tion into the marketplace.
Because testing delays would occur and because by definition in-
plant inspections cannot be conducted for a prototype model, a certifi-
cation program dealing only with final products and not prototype
models would seriously interfere with the marketing of such a new
product. As a result, the general administrative procedures of a certifi-
cation program usually must be supplemented by administrative guide-
lines for the prototype situation. Otherwise, a manufacturer will not
remain an interested and contributing participant in the certification
program.
The appropriate guidelines for prototype evaluation, and scope of
the debate thereon, may vary by industry. Advance testing arrange-
ments for various numbers of prototypes, conducted by laboratories ap-
proved under the certification program and reviewed by the
certification program administrator, may be part of the guidelines.
Provision for in-plant inspections scheduled not on a random unan-
nounced basis but at the request of the manufacturer immediately upon
its decision to begin regular production of the unit, is another possible
guideline component. The original decision to adopt prototype ar-
rangements, however, as well as the details of guidelines relating to
those arrangements, requires both subjective and objective judgments
as to the appropriateness of prototype provisions in a certification
program.
Number 2]
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2. Frequency and Location of Inspection of Manufacturers' Product
Assembly Lines and Laboratories' Test Equ pment and
Procedures
Another administrative problem concerns the frequency of unan-
nounced in-plant inspections by the certification program administra-
tor and his staff. These inspections are conducted to view each
manufacturer's production procedures and equipment and to gather
random product samples that are tested and compared with test results
of the manufacturer's originally submitted units. The judgment of the
program committees and boards as to the appropriate frequency and
scope of the inspections may well raise different views from the produc-
tion executives, professional engineers, program administrators, and
public interest representatives in certification organizations. The bud-
gets of the manufacturer and the certification program, the availability
of certification program inspection staff, the detail required of the certi-
fication program inspector when visiting a manufacturer's plant, and
the availability of testing time and space at approved laboratories are
factors to be considered in the final judgment. In reconciling the differ-
ent views of committee members on these factors, it is apparent that the
appropriateness variable as to frequency and location of inspections is
a highly subjective one.
The testing laboratories used in the certification program also must
be inspected periodically and approved by the certification program
administrator and his staff. With periodic changes in laboratory test
equipment models and the periodic entry and departure of various lab-
oratories either from the market or from approved status with the certi-
fication program, assuring uniform testing conditions for the products
within the certification program becomes a complex task.
The certification program committees and boards usually have no
alternative but to develop guidelines to assist the program administra-
tor in assessing desirable laboratory test equipment calibration and suf-
ficiency and reviewing laboratory personnel and procedural matters.3
This will ensure that standard test methods are in fact being applied in
uniform fashion by the laboratories affiliated with the program. Be-
cause the laboratories often differ markedly in reputation, physical
plant size or numbers of branches, educational background and skill of
35. The program administrator also reviews laboratory staff personnel and procedural
matters.
[Vol. 60:357
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/5
PRODUCT CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS
laboratory personnel in reading instrumentation and conducting tests,
and management philosophies of the laboratory owners, the extent of
control of the certification program over the laboratories is usually a
sensitive issue. Which laboratory facilities and equipment will need
inspection, and the scope of the inspection and access to equipment
records, are, again, judgments of "appropriateness' that are very
subjective.
A serious issue related to program oversight of laboratories is the
extent to which the certification program committees and boards
choose to permit communications between the manufacturers and the
laboratories. During the product test periods, communications may oc-
cur as to the status of the tests, the diagnosis of possible causes of prod-
uct failure, and the resumption of testing after in-test failures.
Manufacturers, which are paying substantial sums for the services of
the test laboratories, believe it is imperative to be kept informed on the
status of the testing of their products. If permitted to engage in those
communications, however, the manufacturers easily may be in a posi-
tion to harass the laboratories and to influence improperly the conduct
and results of the testing. As a result, the outcome of deliberations by
the certification program committees and boards as to the form and
substance of permitted manufacturer-laboratory communications is a
difficult and inherently subjective judgment.
Another difficult judgment is the determination of the number of a
manufacturer's plants that the certification program staff should in-
spect. A manufacturer's assembly lines may be designed in the same
way for different plants across the country, but the operation of those
assembly lines by different personnel and the use of components pro-
duced by different suppliers raises serious questions as to the uniform-
ity of the assembly-line conditions for the products in question. The
certification program committees and boards must establish practical
guidelines to provide adequate assurances that sufficient uniformity ex-
ists between the plants to permit a uniform certification product listing
to apply to the products manufactured at those plants. What constitute
sufficient indicia of uniform conditions between plants is a difficult
question to resolve. Large companies may have sophisticated in-house
quality control programs to provide evidence of uniformity and consis-
tency in product output. Many smaller companies, however, may have
only a primitive in-house quality control program, if any at all. Hence,
program committee judgment will again be subjective.
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Finally, program committees and boards face another question re-
lated to the issue of uniform manufacturing conditions for products
subject to the certification program. They must decide how to deal
with interruptions of manufacturing conditions, either temporary as to
equipment or personnel, or permanent, such as changes in responsible
supervisors, personnel and craftsmen, or equipment producing the
items subject to certification. Certification program guidelines must de-
fine "temporary" breakdowns and substitutions of "different" assem-
bly-line machinery to permit reasonable waivers and exceptions to
certification program inspection rules and procedures. When perma-
nent changes in personnel or in machinery are made, the workmanship
on items subject to certification may be affected. In this instance, waiv-
ers may be inappropriate and guidelines may be required to define the
use of either planned or unannounced in-plant inspections to verify the
supposed uniformity and consistency of manufacturing conditions. In
industries where personnel changes or machinery changes occur fre-
quently, the judgment of the program committees and the board as to
the appropriate guidelines will be critical.
3. Treatment of "Equivalency" Between Products Made of Very
Similar Structural Components and Performance
Characteristics
The essence of a certification program is to provide a third party
validation of a manufacturer's affirmation that its product is produced
similarly to specimens inspected, tested, and found to pass performance
standards. Thus, a manufacturer may seek to extend the certification
status36 of its product X to product Y, without retesting and conducting
plant inspections for product Y. The manufacturer justifies the exten-
sion because the only structural difference between product X and
product Y is that one (or a small number) of the components of
product Y, though produced by different suppliers, are proven sepa-
rately to be equivalent or superior in performance to the related com-
ponents in product X. The manufacturer may want to change to the
components in product Y for reasons such as price considerations or
incremental performance improvements in product Y components as
compared to the related components in product X.
The possibility that performance of products is equivalent or supe-
36. Certification status means a certification program product listing or number.
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rior is one reason for favoring product performance standards over
structural or design standards.37 It is also one of the most criticized
aspects of structural or design standards.3" If similar performance is
the preferred indicator of production similarity, it is reasonable to be-
lieve that, under certain circumstances, the notion of "equivalency"
may logically be used to extend the certification status of certified
product X of a manufacturer to the very closely related product Y of
the same manufacturer. The difference in product Y is so minimal that
a new overall product, in terms of performance, has not been created.
If the principle of "equivalency" for certification purposes is ac-
cepted, important benefits result to manufacturers in avoiding time-
consuming and expensive testing and assembly line inspection of
product Y-type units. Criteria for proof of performance "equivalency"
of product X and product Y can become, however, a much debated
subject for certification program committees and boards.3 9 The pur-
pose of product performance certification programs is neither to
wander afield into the subject of equivalency of product components
nor to establish lists of specific approved equivalent component items.
It is, therefore, generally left for the product manufacturer to demon-
strate to a certification program committee, on an ad hoc but scientific
basis pursuant to program guidelines, that the overall performance of
product X and product Y is equivalent. This offer of proof usually is
based on statistical and laboratory evidence developed by the manufac-
turer or by a laboratory retained by the manufacturer. Only in this
way, however, can a needless and economically punishing distinction
of form over substance be avoided and a meaningful characterization
of new or different overall products be made, in performance terms,
without paralyzing the certification program. The professional judg-
ments necessary for this task are certainly among the most challenging
ones to face certification committees and boards.
Finally, an ultimately significant judgment task for program commit-
tees and boards is to consider the possible objections or appeals that a
program participant or participants might make to adverse administra-
tive determinations by the program administrator. These determina-
tions may include analysis of specific technical matters, the general
37. See FTC PROPOSED RULE AND STAFF REPORT, supra note 22, at 162-71.
38. Id.
39. The truism that "a meeting of three professional engineers will produce at least four
professional opinions," certainly applies in this instance.
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delisting of a certified product due to a laboratory test failure, or other
noncompliance by the manufacturer with program procedures. The
due process requirements providing for the prompt hearing and resolu-
tion of such objections and an appeals mechanism is well established in
this context.40
The certification program committees and boards, composed of rep-
resentatives of participant companies, help provide program manage-
ment effectiveness, flexibility, and technical expertise for the competent
operation of nonprofit certification programs. Furthermore, this par-
ticipant input attracts the voluntary support of a substantial number of
participants so that the certification programs can be economically via-
ble. These vital management decisions, which inevitably must be made,
involve the exercise of many subjective as well as objective judgments.
This reality, however, belies the assumption of some commentators4'
that judgment matters seldom truly arise in this circumstance and, thus,
that a minimal conflict of interest problem exists in certification
programs.
Technical experts and business executives with "hands on" experi-
ence from participating companies serve as the decisionmakers on cer-
tification program committees and boards. The process of establishing
the needed program guidelines and interpretations necessarily invites a
vigorous clash of engineering experience and viewpoints, laboratory
experience and viewpoints, practical manufacturing experience and
viewpoints, and possible public interest representative or consumer
criticism and viewpoints. The adversary process in which these differ-
ent viewpoints are heard actually assures the very fullest range of ex-
pression on the technical and administrative questions at hand. The
openness of these committee and board discussions, a basic due process
requirement, is well justified in light of the complex administrative is-
sues which must be resolved for certification programs to operate with
continuity and integrity.
40. FTC Adv. Op. No. 457 (File No. 713 7002), 78 FTC 1628 (1971), codfiedat 16 C.F.R.
§ 15.457 (1981). See McCreery Angus Farms v. American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D.
Ill.), aft'd, 506 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974).
41. Wachtel, supra note 1, at 31.
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F. The Potential Conflicts of Interest Which May Surface During the
Discussions and Decisionmaking of Program Committees and
Boards
Certification programs, as an aspect of industry self-regulation,
viewed in light of necessary administrative decisionmaking, may be-
come fraught with antitrust dangers. The core problem is the potential
conflicts of interest that are present when persons with a direct stake in
the outcome of their decisions make critical judgments. A company
employee may be as reluctant to vote in favor of a decision harmful to
his own company as he is to approve a decision beneficial to a specific
competitor. The temptation to vote in favor of a decision harmful to a
competitor may be strong. Such a decision may also give rise to anti-
trust problems, unless the record in support of that decision, procedur-
ally and substantively, indicates fairness and openness in the
consideration of all available relevant evidence.
Commercial conflicts of interest of the decisionmaking representa-
tives of participant companies would quickly compromise the integrity
of certification programs were the decisionmaking not subject to an ad-
equate system of fairness and openness safeguards. In the absence of
such safeguards, company representatives might disregard the stated
purposes of the certification program and exploit its market influence
for unilateral corporate advantage through too narrow or too stringent
guidelines, interpretations, decisions, and the anticompetitive exclusion
of products from the marketplace. Similarly, conflicts of interest could
sway decision makers into being too lax or too broad in their guide-
lines, interpretations, and decisions, thus rendering the importance of
the certification program so uncertain as to create a virtual fraud or
misrepresentation of product quality and performance on the public.
Overall, commercial conflicts of interest, without safeguards, would
also threaten the basic public interest in the objective evaluation of
technical and policy certification questions.
Requiring safeguards against conflicts of interest, and ensuring the
admissibility of evidence setting forth the existence and scope of these
safeguards, appears to be the best rule42 for successfully advancing and
protecting: (1) due process interests of openness in necessary interpre-
42. See Brief for National Commission for Health Certifying Agencies as Amicus Curiae at
6, American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981)
(No. 80-1765) [hereinafter cited as Certifying Agencies Brief] (on file with the Washington Univer-
sity Law Quarterly).
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tative discussions, (2) public interests in the exercise of technical exper-
tise and competence, and (3) antitrust interests such as lowering
barriers to market entry and increasing productivity.
IV. THE ANTITRUST LOGIC OF CERTIFICATION ORGANIZATIONS IN
LIGHT OF THE OVERVIEW OF ORGANIZATION
DECISIONMAKING
A. A Sound Basis Exists, Legally and Economically, to View
Certifcation Programs as Industry- Wide Builders of
Competition and Productiviy
1. The Rule of Reason Framework
Justice Brandeis' famous exposition of the rule of reason standard
was set forth in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,43 the original
decision of the United States Supreme Court in 1918 applying the rule
of reason to the activities of an industry self-regulation group. 4 In Chi-
cago Board of Trade the various Board of Trade rules and regulations
for brokers were recognized as beneficial industry self-regulation mat-
ters and were upheld by the Court as not unduly inhibiting
competition.
Subsequently, in 1925, the Supreme Court in Maple Flooring Manu-
facturers Associations v. United States45 expressly approved, under a
rule of reason standard, the practice of product standardization by a
trade association. The Court noted that use of the standards, despite
some restraints on competition, was beneficial to the industry and to
consumers.46 Since 1925 courts have viewed industry self-regulation
activities with favor. In each case, however, the courts have examined
the specific self-regulation activities of the industry groups to determine
whether their redeeming procompetition benefits, in light of pertinent
surrounding circumstances, will outweigh any possible restraints on
43. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
44. Basically, the rule of reason calls for an in-depth analysis of all factors present in the case.
For further discussion and the specific language employed by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of
Trade, see notes 14-15 supra.
45. 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
46. Id. at 566. In Maple Flooring, the association members, all manufacturers of hard-wood
flooring, exchanged information on past and present prices, stock on hand and transportation
costs. Id. at 566-67. The Court stated, "[w]e do not conceive that the members of trade associa-
tions become such conspirators merely because they gather and disseminate information . . .
bearing on the business in which they are engaged and make use of it in the management and
control of their individual businesses." Id. at 584. See note 68 infra.
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competition also posed by the activities.47
Recent cases also have specifically expressed approval of standards
and certification programs which meet a rule of reason standard a.4  In
Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Association49 the
originator of three-ply half-inch plywood was unable to sell its lumber
because the certifying association refused to adopt the view that such
plywood was satisfactory for use in the construction industry. In apply-
ing a rule of reason standard, the court acknowledged that a weighing
of the benefits and detriments to competition caused by a certification
program could lead to an acceptable justification for its rules and
procedures.5
Similarly, in Milk and Ice Cream Can Institute v. FTC51 and National
Macaroni Manufacturers Association v. FTC, 2 although the govern-
ment prevailed on various price-fixing charges, the courts emphasized
that they were not holding all standards-related programs unlawful
under the antitrust laws. In Milk and Ice Cream Institute the court ex-
pressly declined to enjoin the association's future standardization
program.-3
Because industry-wide certification programs will be viewed in light
47. Eg., Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 468 F. Supp.
154 (C.D. Calif. 1979), 484 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Calif.) (temporary injunction), rev'd, 634 F.2d
1197 (9th Cir. 1980).
48. See, e.g., National Macaroni Mfrs. Assoc. v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965); Milk and
Ice Cream Can Institute v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1946); Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Doug-
las Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Or. 1966), aj'd, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969).49. 261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Or. 1966), af'd, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1024 (1969).
50. The court held:
[A]ny system of standards pre-supposes that there are standard and non-standard items.
Those who produce products which are not standard are to some extent penalized and
trade to some extent is restrained. This much however is Congressionally sanctioned
and the court is of the opinion that, in the absence of a bad purpose, mistakes made in
the formulation or maintenance of standards do not subject the one making the mistake
to antitrust liability.
261 F. Supp. at 159 (footnote omitted).
51. 152 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1946).
52. 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965).
53. 152 F.2d at 483. The court stated that:
The present plan has been tested and found unlawful and we see no reason why some
other plan of which the Commission might complain should not be tested in the usual
way rather than in a proceeding for violating the cease and desist order, as would be the
case if this provision should remain in the order.
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of these precedents, it is evident that full attention to the complexities
of market structures, the validity of underlying standards, and the de-
monstrable procompetitive benefits of a certification program in a
given industry will be required. Furthermore, the administrative prac-
tices, guidelines, interpretations and decisions of a certification pro-
gram will be essential elements in a successful defense in court against
charges of improper and collusive exclusion of products from the
marketplace.
Among the market complexities to be found in today's economy
which deserve the greatest attention are the phenomena of increased
industrial concentration54 and declines in the growth of industrial pro-
ductivity55 in various segments of the economy. While the causes, ef-
fects, and dangers of these economic situations have been debated at
length, 6 it can be agreed that considerable evidence exists to the effect
that oligopolistic markets resulting from increased concentration im-
pair competition and promote cartel or monopoly-like pricing.5 7 Fur-
ther, the stagnant, if not declining, level in the economy of industrial
productivity and efficiency, whether absolute or relative, is the antithe-
sis of the ultimate goals of antitrust policy.
Those elements of the marketplace hierarchy, such as certification
programs, which arguably work to counter these economic problems,
thus deserve urgent attention today. Such attention is essential not
only for a better understanding of their unique characteristics as build-
ers of competition and productivity in general, but also because these
characteristics are crucial under a rule of reason standard when anti-
trust plaintiffs attack such programs in court.
2. The Numerous Economic Benefts to the Marketplace from
Certlfcation
The economic benefits and antitrust interests advanced by properly
administered product performance certification programs are becoming
increasingly significant, especially with respect to concentrated indus-
54. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
55. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
56. See notes 2-3 supra and accompanying text. See also E. MANSFIELD, PRINCIPLES OF
MICROECONoMIcs, 217-39 (3d ed. 1980).
57. See generally C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 27 (1959); Adams, Antitrust andMonopo.A New Law is Needed, 9 ANTITRUST L, &
ECON. REV. 49, 49 (1977); Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts-From
Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REV. 285, 298 (1967).
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tries. These aspects thus provide a sound rationale for the protection
and promotion of certification programs.
In general terms, product performance certification programs present
eleven economic benefits. First, certification programs present the op-
portunity to market certified products. This may lower artificial barri-
ers to market entry to new firms, which can demonstrate the value of
their products quickly, objectively, and convincingly. 8 Certification
programs may thus maximize the number of competitors and the
number of product choices within an industry by facilitating the entry
of new and smaller producers into the market.
The facilitation of market entry also occurs because these new pro-
ducers can avoid unnecessary product differentiation and undue capital
requirements as a result of certification programs.5 9 Unnecessary prod-
uct differentiation is that which is "artificial" in economic terms and
exists in form, not substance. It may be due to excessive image-related
and nonfunctional information advertising which does not relate to
performance, or marginal real differences in product performance or
differences extremely difficult to measure.6" Undue capital require-
ments for a new, innovative, firm are those which are "artificial" or
excessive to the extent that they relate to attempts to meet high produc-
tion quality targets but for. products with no pre-established measur-
able basis of comparison to supposedly comparable competitive prod-
ucts, or unnecessary research and development or market development
expenses. 6'
Great advantages exist especially from certification programs in in-
creasingly concentrated and oligopolistic industries, such as various
specialty machinery industries. The corporate "David" with a certified
product has a means of effectively competing with the corporate
"Goliaths," and stronger competition will develop as certification pro-
grams function to allow more "Davids" to enter the market. Certifica-
tion programs thus provide a unique means to counter the antitrust
dangers of overconcentrated industries.
58. See generally Hoffman, supra note 21, at 61.
59. See generally Tag Mfrs. Inst. v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452, 462 (Ist Cir. 1949); FTC PROPOSED
RULE AND STAFF REPORT, supra note 22, at 44-53.
60. See R. BoPx, supra note 2, at 312-30; M. GREEN, B. MOORE & B. WASSERSTEIN, supra
note 2, at 13.
61. See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 320-24; M. GREEN, B. MOORE & B. WASSERSTEIN, supra
note 2, at 13.
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In times of high interest rates, the speed of product acceptance may
also be the life-or-death key to the survival for new companies, whose
cash flow is an important business planning factor. Certification pro-
grams assist in the realization of faster product acceptance in the mar-
ket and therefore facilitate market entry by new firms in this fashion as
well.
Second, certification programs may increase the manufacturing pro-
ductivity of all competitors in an industry. They facilitate the produc-
tion cost efficiencies and the quality control associated with longer
production runs and methods proven to yield desired and demonstra-
ble quality performance in the manufacturer's products.62
To the extent that minimum- or graded-performance standards can
serve to eliminate needless variety (assuming needless variety can be
demonstrated), product certification programs may also substantially
reduce manufacturers' production costs which, in turn, reduce prices.
Certification programs also increase industry manufacturing productiv-
ity by providing an incentive to manufacture products that meet and
possibly exceed standardized levels of performance.
Third, certification programs may provide accurate, shorthand infor-
mation facilitating comparative cost and quality purchasing by direct
buyers and by those indirect buyers who can influence product choices
and purchases. This enables such product selectors, whether profes-
sionals or members of the public, to allocate their dollars most effi-
ciently. Certification programs may thereby maximize well-informed
purchasing decisions.63
Fourth, to the extent that certification programs promote product
uniformity, potential buyers may benefit from product interchangeabil-
ity, convenience, and increased price competition. 6
Fifth, certification programs and the standards they embrace may
also serve as a channel for acceptance and spreading of product
innovation.65
Sixth, certification programs may provide market incentives for pro-
viding products of improved quality, without precluding the availabil-
ity of less costly lower quality products acceptable to a "reasonable
62. See generally Hoffman, supra note 21, at 61.
63. Id.
64. Id. a 59-61.
65. Id.
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man."66 At the same time, certification programs provide a disincen-
tive to produce "junk" products unacceptable to a "reasonable man."
Seventh, certification programs may lessen the likelihood of anti-
competitive pricing and sales conspiracies. They create generic aspects
to products that, to the extent the products are sold on a more fungible
or commodity-like basis and less on a custom-made or brand-name ba-
sis, will mean market transactions may approach more closely the
economists' model of perfect competition. Resulting market transac-
tions may also principally reflect buyer price preferences, product
cross-elasticity, and a reduced chance of successful collusion and price
conspiracies.67
Eighth, certification programs may deter frivolous, unfair, or decep-
tive advertising claims by producers generally. They create publicly
available third party inspection and validation records of product qual-
ity and performance in light of meaningful standards. This will benefit
both producers and buyers because certification programs help avoid
confused buying decisions by providing an alternative to overly techni-
cal and overly complicated product claims.
Ninth, certification programs may maximize competition between a
product industry as a whole and other industries. They maximize the
availability of information on ranges of product performance for an
industry with a view for what is identified as important product quali-
ties reflected in product standards.
Tenth, certification programs may provide an opportunity and a role
for the effective expression of public interest. The concerns of technical
experts who render advice to the public, such as engineering professors,
and those who make choices on behalf of the public, such as architects,
can be voiced. Participation by consumer or public interest representa-
tives in certification programs facilitates this. The expression of these
concerns thus may impact on product manufacturing at an early stage
of product marketing. These representatives will continue to review
carefully the underlying validity of the standards used by the certifica-
tion program. This may help avoid undue, wasteful, and nonproduc-
tive trial and error in manufacturer decisions regarding market needs.
This opportunity may also provide a forum for voicing long-range pub-
66. See WachteL supra note 1, at 1-4.
67. See generally E. MANSFIaLD, supra note 56.
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lic concerns which may complement necessarily short-term corporate
business planning and profitability concerns.
Finally, in general, certification programs serve as an overall force to
enhance competition by simply highlighting the strengths and weak-
nesses of each manufacturer's product9.
Recognizing these types of considerations, the Supreme Court more
than fifty years ago pointed out that standardization-related industry
activities, which include certification programs, definitely can be bene-
ficial to the industry and to consumers.
68
Certification programs, however, due to their reliance on standards,
may have anticompetitive potential as well. Certification that promotes
reliance on standards may eliminate some alternatives as to quality and
price.69 Several examples exist of industry-wide certification programs
being disapproved in Federal Trade Commission advisory opinions.
These programs were invalidated on grounds of anticompetitive poten-
tial and failure to provide for necessary due process openness in the
development of program guidelines and decisions.
70
On balance, certification programs justifiably may be described as
possible builders of industry-wide competition and productivity. In
view of the dangers posed by possible conflicts of interest of program
decision makers, however, clear recognition of the indicia of innocent
intent on the part of certification organizations not to engage in illegal
conduct is needed. Moreover, these indicia must be admissible as evi-
68. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 566 (1925). The court stated,
"[the defendants have engaged in many activities . . . which are admittedly beneficial to the
industry and to consumers; such as co-operative advertising and the standardization and improve-
ment of its product." Id.
69. See generally Hoffman, supra note 21, at 59-61. It has been pointed out that:
[Reliance on] a standard may drive a desirable but non-standard product off the market.
Thus, an industry may promulgate a standard [and implement a certification program]
ostensibly designed to upgrade quality which also raises price; the consumer may be
forced to pay more for quality he does not want, or possibly does not even get [to the
extent he relies on certification and standards]. Standards [and implementing certifica-
tion programs] can also be used to fix prices and allocate markets, by limiting the diver-
sity of products. Competitive patterns can be distorted if standards [implemented
through certification programs] artificially classify functionally-interchangeable products
into separate groups, or if certification criteria are adopted which cannot be applied with
equal ease to all products in a market. [Reliance on standards through certification pro-
grams] may enshrine the status quo and actually inhibit innovation. A competitor offer-
ing a [noncertified] nonstandard product--e.g., one using a particular raw material-
may be shut out of the market altogether.
Id.
70. See, e.g., FTC Adv. Op. (File No. 783 7008), 91 FTC 1204 (1978); FTC Adv. Op. (File
No. 773 7001), 89 FTC 668 (1977); FTC Adv. Op. (File No. 773 7003), 89 FTC 654 (1977).
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dence on the issue of conspiratorial intent for them to be of value in
antitrust litigation. Only in this manner may certification programs
meet the promise of becoming synonymous with building industry-
wide competition and productivity and also avoid being victimized by
possible abuses of their participants. The intent for a certification pro-
gram to achieve the economic advantages noted above, in terms of the
reasonably foreseeable results of the organization's activities, is cer-
tainly one relevant factor in proving innocent antitrust intent. The in-
tent to resist conflicts of interest and any resulting antitrust abuses is
another relevant factor in disproving wrongful conduct.
The overview of the actual administrative practices of certification
programs suggests that any possible antitrust abuses actually flow spe-
cifically from those conflicts of interest which may surface as the certifi-
cation organization dutifully observes the technical interest of expertise
and competency in program administration, and the due process inter-
ests of openness in decisionmaking concerning program guidelines and
interpretations. These two interests, however, are not inconsistent or
necessarily contradictory. Rather, both interests can be protected, and
the opportunity for possible conflicts of interest neutralized, by safe-
guards against those conflicts of interest. The relevant questions be-
come whether a distinct legal duty exists for the existence of safeguards;
what the effect of proof of meeting any such duty should be on the issue
of conspiratorial intent; and how these safeguards may be achieved.
B. 4 Distinct Duty Exists for Certlfcation Programs to Provide
Safeguards Against Participant Conflicts of Interest
A distinct duty exists, derived from various due process considera-
tions, for certification organizations to provide safeguards against par-
ticipant conflicts of interest. The 1963 decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,7" and subse-
quent court decisions, have clearly established that industry-wide orga-
nizations with substantial commercial importance and powers of
industry self-regulation have a special duty to administer their pro-
grams fairly. In Silver the Court ruled that the Exchange's right to self-
regulation would be lost if the Exchange took disciplinary action
against a member without affording due process procedural safeguards,
71. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
Number 21
Washington University Open Scholarship
382 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
including notice and a hearing.72
Subsequent courts, relying on Silver and requiring due process pro-
cedures to be followed in disciplinary proceedings by industry-wide
groups, have fashioned a right of fairness in the conduct of those disci-
plinary matters which, if violated, may lead to an antitrust violation.
The courts have, for example, relied on the procedural requirements
established by the Supreme Court in Silver to invalidate on antitrust
grounds the expulsion of an association member when the association
failed to provide adequate notice to the member of the charges against
him, adequate opportunity to respond to those charges, and the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine his accusers.73
It is also clear that nonprofit industry groups of competitors that offer
a service conferring a market advantage on products, such as that pro-
vided by sponsorship of a certification program, must be held to a spe-
cial duty of care in ensuring the fair and impartial administration of
the program.74 Taking cognizance of the substantial economic power,
public influence, and self-regulatory nature of certification programs,
courts under Silver and its progeny, as well as United States v. Terminal
RailroadAssociation of St. Louis, 75 have established the duty to assure
fairness and integrity in certification programs.
In the case of standards-development organizations, specifically
ASME, the duty to protect and safeguard program integrity was clearly
noted by the Second Circuit in Hydrolevel. The court noted that
ASME's influence created by its code of standards required it to safe-
72. Id. at 361-63. The Court specifically found that:
The concerted action of the Exchange and its members [in disconnecting the direct-wire
connections which a member had with the other Exchange members] was, in simple
terms, a group boycott depriving petitioners of a valuable business service which they
needed in order to complete effectively as broker-dealers in the over-the-counter securi-
ties market.
Id. at 347.
73. Rearick v. Holstein-Friesian Ass'n, 472 F. Supp. 464 (W.D. Pa. 1979); McCreery Angus
Farms v. American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D. Ill.), a'd, 506 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974).
74. See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (association involved in
determinations of which companies may enter a market must deal fairly and impartially with all
applicants).
75. 224 U.S. 383 (1912). In TerminalRailroad the Supreme Court found that an association
of railway terminal systems formed for the express purpose of obtaining control over all means of
railway access toand from St. Louis over the Mississippi River violated the Sherman Act. Id. at
409-10.
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guard against misuse of that influence.7 6
The economic power and influence of certification organizations is at
least as strong as the economic power of standards-development orga-
nizations. Certification programs provide the visible and credible evi-
dence of compliance with those standards and certification marks that
serve as the recognizable indicia of quality in the marketplace. Accord-
ingly, the duty of a certification organization to guard against conflicts
of interest must be at least as strong as that of a standards-development
organization. Any less responsibility would immediately serve to dis-
credit the value of certification programs where objectivity and reliabil-
ity must, practically speaking, be a fundamental goal of the
certification system.
The applicable due process standards for certification programs are
slightly different from those applicable to standards-development orga-
nizations. Considerations of notice, applicable to standards-develop-
ment organizations, are not included. In resolving the disputes and
questions that may arise at committee and board meetings relating to
administrative guidelines, interpretations, and responses to partici-
pants' requests for clarification, the due process required is best de-
scribed as fairness, or fair play.77
This principle of fairness has procedural and substantive aspects. In
procedural terms, fairness includes three elements:78 a right to ade-
quate disclosure of the grounds of a program guideline, interpretation,
or adjudicative decision; a right for any complainant to show why the
guideline, interpretation, or decision may be in error; and, a right for
the complainant to attempt to satisfy the objections of the committee or
board as to the basis of the dispute. Fairness in substantive terms re-
quires that the certification guidelines, interpretations, and decisions as
to disputed matters be supported by a demonstrable factual basis that is
neither arbitrary nor inconsistent with reference to other organization
decisions.
76. Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118, 126 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
There is a corresponding duty to be aware of and guard against the temptations thus
afforded by inherent conflicts of interest. Absent some internal review procedures, no
individual should be empowered to rule dispositively on the fitness of a competitor's
product.
Id.
77. Wachtel, supra note 1, at 31.
78. Id.
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This due process interest in fairness is one step removed from the
due process interest in openness at general certification organization
committee and board meetings. Both relate to the need for preserving
full, unfettered, and open technical and policy discussions.
The distinct duty to safeguard against conflicts of interest is created
by the joining of the due process duty to provide fairness with the due
process duty to provide openness. It is not a matter of semantics; 79 the
procedures relating to openness are different from the procedures relat-
ing to fairness. It is these types of procedures, when viewed together,
that serve the larger and separate purpose of neutralizing the conflicts
of interest discussed earlier. When faced with charges of antitrust lia-
bility stemming from the possible misconduct of small numbers of its
decisionmaking members it is critical for a certification organization to
recognize such a distinct duty in these terms. Only in this manner will
the organization find the analytic means by which it can establish a
basis in evidence for demonstrating the lack of conspiratorial intent.80
C. Ia Cert/ication Organization Meets the Duty to Provide Safeguards
Against Conflicts of Interests, the Organization Should be Found to
be Free of Conspiratorial Intent
A rule of reason standard, as the applicable test for possible antitrust
conspiracy liability of a nonprofit certification organization, actually
encompasses an examination of two interrelated subissues. The first
issue concerns the reasonableness of any claimed restraint on competi-
tion, based upon weighing the alleged anticompetitive and procompeti-
tive aspects of the restraint, together with the possibility of any less
restrictive alternative,"' to accomplish the redeeming benefits claimed
for the restraint. Fundamentally, this examination would be an inquiry
into whether the certification organization has caused any cognizable
economic antitrust injury. The second issue concerns the intent of a
certification organization and whether it knowingly participated in any
conspiracy to create an unreasonable restraint of trade. The issue of
79. The only cases to date in which certification organizations have been held liable for viola-
tions of antitrust law relate to apparent violations of the "openness" duty or the "fairness" duty
and arbitrary and capricious denials of certification status. E.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples
Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
80. Various practical suggestions as to how best to implement combined "openness" and
"fairness" procedures are discussed in text at IV D infra.
81. P. AREEDA, ANTrmusT ANALYsis 257-87 (1967).
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intent is also intrinsically bound with the issue of the reasonableness of
any claimed restraint, because an understanding of intent "may help
the Court to interpret [economic] facts and to predict consequences. ' 82
Intent is also a separate issue, however, for a finding, necessary for lia-
bility, of participation in a conspiracy. 3 Judging the intent of a collec-
tive entity such as a certification organization may be very difficult,
especially because under a rule of reason standard, virtually all aspects
of the organization's processes would seem, at first blush, relevant for
scrutiny.
The broad rule of reason standard applicable to certification pro-
grams under StructuralLaminates84 may, however, provide some relief.
If a certification organization meets the legal duty to provide safe-
guards against conflicts of interest, then it would be most appropriate to
find no conspiratorial intent in any antitrust case arising out of claimed
abuses stemming from conflicts of interest. The evidence of meeting
that duty is provided by the existence and use of organizational
processes that guarantee due process openness and fairness. Safe-
guards against conflicts of interest therefore constitute not only the
most probable evidence of existence of nonconspiratorial intent, but in
fact would encompass the only relevant evidence on the issue of intent.
This is so inasmuch as a finding that the legal duty to provide safe-
guards against conflicts of interest had been met would then be contra-
dictory, as a matter of law, with any finding that the organization itself
had lent its program in any way to serve the singular anticompetitive
purposes of any members.
A broad rule of reason approach, but so focused, certainly would
provide the most liberal opportunity for certification programs to serve
their unique role as industry-wide builders of competition and produc-
tivity. One commentator has speculated that "it is doubtful that the
relaxed attitude taken by the court in StructuralLaminates... would
82. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
83. Under the law of conspiracy, several tests exist to permit a finding of "knowing participa-
ton" in a conspiracy: (I) knowing acquiescence, (2) pervasive participation in a common
scheme or plan, (3) the natural or probable consequences of acts, (4) specific intent. See, e.g.,
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 143 (1966); United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 146-47 (1948); Eastern States Lumber Retail Dealers' Ass'n v. United
States, 234 U.S. 600, 612 (1919). In criminal felony antitrust cases, the typical criminal "specific
intent" test would appear to apply.
84. Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Or. 1966),
aft'd, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969).
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find wide judicial acceptance today."85 Contrary to this view, once it is
.recognized that a distinct duty exists for certification programs to pro-
vide safeguards against conflicts of interest, it would be highly appro-
priate to expect a revitalization of a liberal Structural Laminates
approach in conflict of interest antitrust cases.
Confusion persists, however, as to the appropriate legal standard ap-
plicable in conflict of interest cases attempting to resolve the issue of
conspiratorial intent. It is the Hydrolevel litigation which provides the
best example of this confusion and of the sort of approach that can
drastically undermine the logic of a rule of reason standard in deter-
mining the possible antitrust liability of a certification organization.
In Hydrolevel86 a conflict of interest arose when two ASME mem-
bers, selected by ASME to interpret boiler standards,87 were paid by
competitors of Hydrolevel and intentionally used their positions in the
ASME standards program to drive Hydrolevel out of the boiler safety
device business. 8 The public was first notified of the incident in a
newspaper article.89 Thereafter, ASME's Professional Practice Com-
85. Blecher, Product Standards and Certcation Programrs, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 223, 227
n.30 (1980).
86. "Hydrolevel Corporation (Hydrolevel) made safety devices to protect the public against
personal injury and death from exploding boilers." Certifying Agencies Brief, supra note 42, at 2-
4.
87. "The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) conducts a process for estab-
lishing and interpreting standards for boilers and over 400 other devices. These standards are
relied on by the public and incorporated in state legislation as impartial and objective evaluations
of quality. ASME represents them to be such." Id. at 2.
88. The chief ASME members who were selected by ASME to interpret standards and
who participated in this scheme were Messrs. T. R. Hardin, executive vice-president of
Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company (Hartford, the country's lead-
ing seller of boiler insurance to the industry) and John James, vice-president of research
at McDonald & Miller (M&M, a corporation manufacturing up to 85 percent of the float
cutoffs that were directly competitive with Hydrolevel's probe device). Hardin and James
secretly drafted a letter to ASME requesting a code "interpretation." The ASME "an-
swer" was written by Hardin, but signed by Mr. W. Bradford Hyott, an ASME official
who routinely signed such letters without supervising or reviewing the conditions of their
preparation or their content. This misleading letter was used by M&M to disparage
Hydrolevel's product to the trade.
Id.
89. In July 1974 a reporter for the Wall Street Journal, Ms. Priscilla S. Meyer, published an
article concerning ASME. Myer, How Rival's Use of 'Industry Code' Report Created Problemsfor
a Tiny Company, Wall St. J., July 9, 1974, at 44, col. 1. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Paul T. Howse, Jr.,
a member of ASME's governing board and ASME regional vice-president, wrote the ASME presi-
dent, Dr. Rogers B. Finch: "If the facts are as stated in the article, it would seem that Mr. James
should not only be relieved of his duties on the boiler code committee but he should also be kicked
out of ASME for unethical conduct." Certifying Agencies Brief, supra note 42, at 3.
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mittee (PPC) conducted an official investigation and promulgated a
resolution that was circulated to ASME's 90,000 members, public iI-
braries, and others through ASME's official magazine, Mechanical
Engineering.9
0
In March 1975 one of the two ASME members admitted before the
United States Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly that he
had destroyed relevant and material documents. 91 In 1979 a jury sit-
ting in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York found ASME to be a coconspirator to an unreasonable restraint
of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.92 In 1980 the judgment of
liability under section 1 of that act was affirmed.93
In view of these facts, the Second Circuit proceeded to adopt a vica-
rious antitrust liability principal and "apparent authority" agency stan-
dard by which it upheld the antitrust liability of ASME for the
misconduct of its two members. This approach, however, was totally
unrealistic because it completely begged the question of how, in view of
admittedly existing openness and breadth in the ASME committee or-
ganization, ASME might have avoided a finding of conspiratorial in-
tent despite the actions of the two. For certification programs as well as
ASME, the approach adopted by the Second Circuit in Hydrolevel can
be viewed only as a tragic and confusing chapter in antitrust history.
The main defect of the vicarious liability principle and "apparent
agency" evidentiary standard, however, is that together they create a
strict liability standard or virtually a per se rule of liability. It is a sham
to call such an unduly narrow evidentiary standard as to conspiratorial
intent an example of a rule of reason approach to liability. The United
States Supreme Court taught in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp. 94 that it is a broad rule of proof, not a narrow theory of
90. That November 19, 1974 resolution stated: "PPC investigated the entire [Hydrolevel]
incident and found no basis for further consideration of the issue .... This official resolution
commended James for his "forthright manner," condemned "harassment" for ASME members
serving "in their line of duty," and concluded that ASME procedures for handling code interpre-
tation inquiries were "extremely well-founded." Certifying Agencies Brief, supra note 42, at 3.
91. Id.
92. 15 U.S.C. §§ I & 2 (1976).
93. 635 F.2d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 1980).
The Court of Appeals did not conclude that ASME maintained a serious, systematic program to
prohibit, detect, investigate, or discipline conflict of interests. Hardin and James were never disci-
pimed by ASME. Certifying Agencies Brief, supra note 42, at 2-4.
94. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
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agency, that is appropriate under a rule of reason approach. 95 The Sec-
ond Circuit's application of agency law to the ASME standards pro-
gram and the court's analogy to tort liability was thus totally
unnecessary. The analytic means exist by which to recognize the dis-
tinct duty of a standards-related organization to safeguard against con-
flicts of interest and to determine whether that duty has been met.
Most pragmatically, the narrow evidentiary approach of agency law
also is confusing because a rule of reason standard supposedly remains
applicable to the issue of overall liability and the subissue of antitrust
injury but, in substance, is to be abandoned on the subissue of conspir-
atorial intent. What a jury is to make of the proof of liability under
such an internally contradictory approach is anyone's guess. The only
apparent result is that the Hydrolevel split standard of evidence would
increase the risk of certification program liability, have an undesirable
chilling effect on certification programs, and, by diminishing the popu-
larity of certification programs, would be fundamentally
anticompetitive.
In view of the availability, for analytic as well as practical purposes,
of the certification organization duty to provide safeguards against con-
flicts of interest, proof of "apparent agency" simply should not be ad-
missible. It is irrelevant and contradicts, as a matter of law, the broad
rule of reason liability and evidentiary standard permitted by Structural
Laminates. A rule of reason evidentiary approach, already the rule as
to deciding the issue of antitrust injury, should remain the standard for
conspiratorial intent as well. In view of the desirability of protecting
the unique role of certification programs as industry-wide builders of
competition and efficiency, such an approach is most appropriate and,
quite practically, constitutes a much less confusing evidentiary
standard.
D. Practical Means Exist to Imfplement Safeguards Against Conflicts
of Interest
Some practical suggestions for providing a highly visible system of
openness and fairness due process safeguards for a certification pro-
95. "The character and effect of a conspiracy are not judged by dismembering it and viewing
its separate parts, but by looking at it as a whole." Id. at 699 (quoting United States v. Patten, 226
U.S. 525, 544 (1913)).
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gram include several elements that should, taken together, help meet
the duty to provide safeguards against conflicts of interest.
1. Use of a broadly constituted cert/fcation organization Board of
Directors, numerous broadly-constituted working
committees, and an independent third-party program
administrator ineligible to provide laboratory
testingfor companies within the program
Broadly constituted representative groups of organization decision
makers assure the greatest openness in the expression of various techni-
cal and policy views necessary for organization guidelines, interpreta-
tions, and decisions. Secrecy and closed executive session meetings
should be avoided. As Justice Brandeis observed: "Sunlight is said to
be the best of disinfectants."96 The presence of public interest repre-
sentatives on the board of directors, with veto control over industry
representatives, is a salutary means for ensuring the fullest exposition
of both public interest views and the views of industry representatives
in support of or in opposition to proposed courses of action. In addi-
tion, it is important to keep the certification organization administra-
tor's functions separate from any laboratory testing arrangements
under the certification program for program participants. This is an
effective method for completely avoiding conflicts of interest that the
administrator might otherwise suffer and that could prove extremely
sensitive for program participants.
2. Use of "Quick-Action Committees" to resolve promptly matters
of interpretation ofprogram guidelines, standards, and test
methods, subject to later ratjfcation by the
organization's Board of Directors
Speed is essential to the practical and fair resolution of many partici-
pant inquiries and problems concerning program guidelines, standards,
and test methods. The regularly held meetings of organization boards
and committees often do not address such matters with the requisite
speed. The use of special "Quick-Action Committees" is an excellent
means to address this problem. Decisions adverse to a participant and
to which the participant objects are stayed pending ratification in due
course by the organization's committees and boards. "Quick-Action
96. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1933).
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Committees" also provide an excellent practical means of weeding out
frivolous objections or innocent misunderstandings that can be re-
solved once competent technical attention is focused on a given ques-
tion or complaint.
3. Use of internal organization due process proceduresfor hearings
on contested decisions of the organization administrator and
committees
Due process fairness requires that careful provision be made for a
participant's right, after proper objection, to a reexamination of pro-
gram decisions or determinations adverse to that participant. The best
record of due process fairness can be established through the use of a
specific appeals procedure allowing review of administrator and com-
mittee determinations by the organization's board of directors.
4. Use ofpublished organization guidelines, interpretations, and
determinations as to program procedures and such matters
as "equivalency, " "prototypes-in-test, " and inspections
of manufacturing plants and test laboratories,
together with the use of organization license agreements with
particoants spelling out the respective rights and duties of the
program participant
Due process fairness also suggests the need for a published record of
organization guidelines and decisions. This will provide clear author-
ity and precedent for organization determinations as well as avoidance
of inconsistent determinations over time by the organization's changing
decisionmakers. Referring to these guidelines in a license agreement
concerning the rights and duties of a participant regarding the certifica-
tion program provides a clearly defined contractual basis for the organ-
ization to enforce its program procedures and guidelines. In addition, a
dearly defined basis exists for a program participant to exercise various
due process procedural rights.
These suggestions should provide a practical basis for building a
clear record of the existence of due process openness and fairness as
part of a certification program. If these and supplemental procedures
are carefully followed in a highly visible manner, charges of prejudicial
actions arising out of alleged conflicts of interest may be rebutted.
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V. CONCLUSION
Nonprofit organizations that conduct certification programs and
their officers and staffs are not the only parties in need of reassurance
that falling victim to the antitrust sins of their participants can be
avoided. The many persons who represent participant companies in
industry-wide certification programs also need to be assured that the
means exist to avoid being trapped by personally disparaging, frivo-
lous, and unfair charges of conflicts of interest. The many competing
companies who participate in certification programs also require the
assurance of fair administrative treatment on interpretative questions
in those programs. Finally, the public needs the assurance that rather
than being victimized by fraudulent and deceptive programs it is being
well served by programs that promote increased product quality, com-
petition, and economic productivity.
Careful attention to the legal duties and rule of reason approach may
help provide the appropriate assurances. Above all, the unique benefits
of certification programs in building industry-wide competition and
productivity can be maximized only when a practical rule of reason
approach is used to scrutinize certification organizations charged with
antitrust abuses relating to conflicts of interest of certain of their deci-
sionmaking representative members. Defining a distinct duty of certifi-
cation organizations to provide safeguards against conflicts of interest,
and the means to meet that duty, represents a step forward in the expo-
sition of such a practical rule of reason approach.
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